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Abstract 
Electricity demand traditionally exhibits a substantial peak during a small number of hours each day. 
Policymakers are aware of the potential efficiency savings that may be generated from a shift in energy 
consumption away from peak times. Smart meters, in conjunction with time-of-use (TOU) pricing, can facilitate 
an improvement in energy efficiency by providing consumers with enhanced information about electricity 
consumption and costs, and thereby encourage a shift away from consumption during peak hours. In 2009-10, 
the Irish Commission for Energy Regulation (CER) co-ordinated a randomised controlled trial in the Irish 
residential electricity market. Smart meters, which replaced the existing mechanical meter readers, were 
introduced in approximately 5,000 households. Participants were divided into control and treatment groups, 
with treatment groups exposed to a variety of TOU tariffs and information stimuli (in-home display (IHD) units, 
monthly billing, etc.). Data was collected over approximately 18 months, with the first half year being used as a 
control period. This paper analyses the response of Irish households to the introduction of TOU tariffs and 
information stimuli. We examine how households responded to the different TOU tariffs, at different times of 
the day (peak, day and night) and in conjunction with different information stimuli. Finally, we examine the 
variation in our results across households of differing socio-economic status (as proxied by education levels). 
We find that TOU tariffs and information stimuli have a significant effect in reducing electricity consumption in 
Ireland, particularly during peak hours. However, while households reduce peak demand significantly after the 
introduction of TOU tariffs and associated information, there is little incremental response to increasing 
differentials between peak and off-peak prices. 
JEL codes: Q41, D12 
Keywords: household electricity demand, electricity pricing, smart metering 
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1 Introduction 
 
Electricity demand traditionally exhibits a substantial peak during a small number of hours each day. 
Policymakers are aware of the potential efficiency savings that may be generated from a shift in 
energy consumption away from peak times. Smart meters, in conjunction with time-of-use (TOU) 
pricing, can facilitate an improvement in energy efficiency by providing consumers with enhanced 
information about electricity consumption and costs, and thereby encourage a shift away from 
consumption during peak hours.  
In the EU, a number of recent pieces of legislation have promoted the use of smart metering, 
including the Electricity Directive 2009/72/EC, which requires Member States to ensure the 
implementation of intelligent metering systems and to carry out a cost-benefit analysis of the 
system by September 2012 (Commission for Energy Regulation, 2011b). In Ireland in May 2009 the 
first National Energy Efficiency Action Plan (NEEAP) was adopted in line with EU requirements, and 
included a commitment to encourage more energy efficient behaviour by households through the 
introduction of smart meters (Commission for Energy Regulation, 2011a).  
In 2007, the Irish Commission for Energy Regulation (CER) announced their intention to introduce a 
trial smart metering experiment in the Irish residential and small-to-medium enterprise (SME) 
electricity markets.1 Smart meters, which replaced the existing mechanical meter readers, were 
introduced in approximately 5,000 households and 650 SMEs. Participants were divided into control 
and treatment groups, with treatment groups exposed to a variety of time-of-use (TOU) tariffs and 
information stimuli (in-home display (IHD) units, monthly billing, etc.). Data was collected over the 
period 14 July 2009 to 31 December 2010, and as the experiment began on 1 January 2010, six 
months of pre-trial data are available for both the control and treatment groups.  
Numerous other countries have experimented with the use of smart meters (e.g US, Canada and 
Denmark)2, and there is a growing international literature analysing the impact of TOU tariffs on 
residential and commercial electricity consumption. The availability of high-quality data on a large 
and representative sample allows us to estimate the impact of TOU pricing on electricity 
consumption in Ireland for the first time.3 Ireland is an interesting case study as much of the 
international literature focuses on the US where the use of air conditioning for residential use is 
common. As in Ireland there is no demand of air conditioning during the summer, the trial results 
show the impact of different TOU and stimuli on residential electricity demand net of the air 
conditioning effects, which accounts for a large part of the household responses in the US (Faruqui 
and Sergici, 2009). In addition, the data also allow us to investigate the impact of a variety of 
                                                             
1 There were three distinct strands to the work; technology trials, customer behaviour trials and a cost-benefit 
analysis for the national roll-out of smart meters (Commission for Energy Regulation, 2011a). 
2 See www.ontario-hydro.com/index.php?page=current_rates and 
www.ctenergyinfo.com/dpuc_time_of_day_rates.htm [last accessed 01 September 2011] for example. Darby 
(2006) maintain that TOU pricing is most common in parts of the world with summer and winter peaks allied 
with supply constraints: California, Ontario, the north eastern states of the US and parts of Australia. For 
evidence on Denmark see Gleerup et al. (2010). 
3 While Gans et al. (2011) analyse the impact of enhanced feedback on electricity consumption in Northern 
Ireland, they focus just on a group of households who were already cognisant of their electricity consumption 
due to their choice of the prepayment option of payment. The extent to which their results are generalisable 
to other household types is debateable. 
3 
 
information stimuli on electricity consumption. Finally, limited socio-economic information on the 
participating households is also available.4  
  
The first aim of this paper is therefore to disentangle the effects of the different TOU tariffs (peak, 
day and night) on residential electricity5 consumption during different times of the day. Our results 
show that different information stimuli lead to differences in household responses during different 
times of the day. In particular, the presence of an IHD that indicates the quantity and cost of 
electricity consumed on a real-time basis leads households to contract their consumption during the 
peak hours, and the magnitude of the contraction increases as the ratio of peak to off-peak prices 
increases. However, the extent of the additional reduction in peak demand due to a steepening tariff 
schedule is very small in absolute terms. The other stimuli (i.e., bi-monthly and monthly paper 
billing) also give rise to reductions in peak demand when TOU tariffs are employed, but for them 
there is little evidence of further reductions as the ratio of peak to off-peak prices rises further. 
 
Second, we investigate the determinants of electricity consumption during different times of the 
day. We find that controlling for day of the week, public holidays, climatic conditions and household 
appliance ownership, the presence of different TOU tariffs affects household electricity consumption 
during the peak hours, but does not lead to a significant change in electricity usage during the day 
and night periods. 
 
Finally, we examine the variation in our results across different socio-economic groups, as proxied by 
the highest level of education completed by the chief income earner of the household. We find that 
households with higher education levels respond to TOU tariffs during the peak period (consistent 
with the overall results noted above), but that households with low education levels are less 
responsive to TOU tariffs. 
 
Section 2 discusses previous research in the area. Section 3 describes our data, while Section 4 
outlines the methodology employed in this paper. Section 5 presents and discusses empirical results, 
while Section 6 summarises and concludes.  
2 Literature review 
Estimates of the price elasticity of electricity demand in the residential sector can be very different 
depending on the type of data used (time-series, cross-section, panel), context (national, regional or 
local economy), size of the variation in price and time periods covered (see also Alberini et al., 2011). 
Here we focus on studies that, similar to the approach used in this paper, use micro-data on 
households and that examine the impact of price and information stimuli on electricity demand. 
 
                                                             
4 As described in Section 3, the quality of the data relating to household income was poor, and as a result, the 
education level of the chief income earner is used to indicate household socio-economic status. 
5 As explained in Section 3, we concentrate on residential customers only in this paper. 
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The extent to which price elasticities differ across population groups is a common focus of research 
in this area. Baker et al. (1989) use data from the British Family Expenditure Survey over the period 
1972-1983 to analyse household expenditure on electricity, gas and other fuels. Prices are national 
averages. They find a significant own-price elasticity of -0.758 for electricity demand, with 
considerable variation in the estimated own-price elasticity across different household types (e.g., 
by presence of children, type of heating, income, etc.). Alberini et al. (2011) estimate price 
elasticities of energy (electricity and gas) demand using data on over 74,000 households in the 50 
largest metropolitan areas in the US over the period 1997-2007. They report price elasticities of 
demand for electricity use that range from -0.67 to -0.86, with the elasticities slightly higher in 
poorer households.  
 
As TOU pricing is becoming more common, so too are studies evaluating households’ responses to 
TOU pricing. Bartusch et al. (2011) examine the impact of the introduction of a demand-based TOU 
tariff on a pilot basis to a group of 500 households in Sweden. Using data before and after the 
introduction of the TOU tariff, they find that total electricity consumption declined by 11.1 per cent 
and 14.2 per cent in the first two years after the change to TOU pricing (with the size of the 
reductions higher in the winter months). They also find a shift in electricity demand from the peak to 
off-peak period of 0.8 and 1.2 percentage points in the first two years (with the shift greater during 
the summer months). Filippini (2011) analyse electricity data at the city level for 22 Swiss cities over 
the period 2000 to 2006. They find that the own-price elasticities vary between -0.80 and -0.89 
during the peak period and between -0.90 and -0.95 during the off-peak period (positive cross-price 
elasticities imply that peak and off-peak electricity are substitutes). An earlier study, also using Swiss 
data, found similar results (Filippini, 1995). Matsukawa (2001) examine the impact of TOU pricing on 
residential electricity demand in Japan. The results show that (1) household response to the high 
price of the peak period is relatively modest, and (2) the relative magnitudes of the price and 
selection effects (i.e., participation in the trial) depend on the ownership of water heaters.  
 
Ham et al. (1997) discuss the importance of accounting for selection when using experimental data 
(the bias induced by voluntary participation in such initiatives is also discussed by Aubin et al., 1995). 
They measure the responsiveness of small commercial customers to TOU pricing using data from a 
TOU experiment conducted by Ontario Hydro. Participants were randomly assigned to control and 
treatment groups, but approximately half of the treatment group refused to participate. Allowing for 
selection has a significant impact on the parameter estimates. Nonetheless, they find a significant 
reduction of 15 per cent in electricity consumption when the peak period is relatively short in length 
(approximately 5 hours) and the peak/off-peak price differential is approximately six to one. For the 
other two treatments, where the length of the peak period is longer and the price differential is 
smaller, no significant reduction is observed. Own-price elasticities of demand are estimated to be -
0.134 in the winter and -0.114 in the summer. 
 
A variant on TOU pricing is dynamic pricing, whereby rates respond to critical periods of electricity 
use. In the US, critical periods occur typically during the top one percent of the hours of the year 
where somewhere between 9-17 percent of the annual peak demand is concentrated. It is very 
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expensive to serve power during these critical periods and even a modest reduction in demand can 
be very cost-effective (Faruqui and Sergici, 2009). A comprehensive review of 15 experiments 
(largely based in the US)6 with dynamic pricing of electricity was undertaken by Faruqui and Sergici 
(2009). They find conclusive evidence that households (residential customers) respond to higher 
prices by lowering use. The magnitude of the price response depends on several factors, such as the 
magnitude of the price increase, the presence of central air conditioning and the availability of 
enabling technologies such as two-way programmable communicating thermostats. Across the 
experiments studied, TOU pricing induces a drop in peak demand that ranges between three to six 
percent and critical-peak pricing tariffs induce a drop in peak demand that ranges between 13 to 20 
percent. When accompanied with enabling technologies, the latter set of tariffs lead to a drop in 
peak demand in the 27 to 44 percent range. Wolak (2011) examines whether households in 
Washington DC face a ‘fixed cost of taking action’ when responding to dynamic hourly prices; he 
finds that the magnitude of the average hourly percentage demand reduction from hourly pricing is 
roughly equal to the estimated percentage demand reduction over a longer duration of high prices. 
 
Charles River Associates (2005) examine the impact of the California Statewide Pricing Pilot (SPP) on 
residential and industrial electricity demand (a TOU and two dynamic pricing tariffs were tested). 
The experiment involved over 2,500 customers and ran from July 2003 to December 2004. The SPP 
also tested an information treatment that urged customers to reduce demand on critical days in the 
absence of time-varying price signals. For residential customers, the estimated average reduction in 
peak-period energy use on critical days was 13.1 percent. Impacts varied across climate zones, from 
a low of –7.6 percent in the relatively mild climate of zone 1 to a high of –15.8 percent in the hot 
climate of zone 4. The average impact on normal weekdays was -4.7 percent, with a range across 
climate zones from –2.2 percent to –6.5 percent. They also found that households with central air 
conditioning were more price responsive and produced greater absolute and percentage reductions 
in peak-period energy use than did households without air conditioning. TOU impacts were less 
significant, due in part to the small sample size, while the information-only treatments were similarly 
insignificant. 
 
As in our experiment, TOU pricing is often combined with various information stimuli. Darby (2006) 
reviews the literature on the impact of feedback (both direct in the form of meters or display 
monitors, and indirect in the form of frequent, accurate billing) on household energy use. She finds 
that overall the literature demonstrates that clear feedback is a necessary element in learning how 
to control fuel use more effectively over a long period of time and instantaneous direct feedback in 
combination with frequent, accurate billing (a form of indirect feedback) is needed as a basis for 
sustained demand reduction. There is some indication that high energy users may respond more 
than low users to direct feedback. In terms of indirect feedback, historic feedback (comparing with 
previous recorded periods of consumption) appears to be more effective than comparative or 
normative information (comparing with other households, or with a target figure).  
                                                             
6 All experiments are based on panel data, involving repeated measurements on a cross-section of customers. 
Some of the customers are placed on the dynamic pricing rate (or rates) and fall into the treatment group. 
Others stay on existing rates and fall into the control group. Technically, the control group should be randomly 
chosen (Faruqui and Sergici, 2009). 
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Gans et al. (2011) estimate the effect of real-time usage information on residential electricity 
consumption in Northern Ireland. They exploit the introduction in an exogenous change in the type 
of information provided to one set of customers, i.e., those on prepayment accounts, in April 2002. 
From that date, prepayment customers received immediate feedback about their electricity 
consumption via keypad meters.7 They use data from 18 waves of Continuous Household Survey of 
Northern Ireland (from 1990 to 2009), which is merged with price and plan information from the 
electricity utility, and weather data (the final sample size is over 45,000 observations). They find that 
households using the keypad use 15-20 per cent less electricity than other households, even 
controlling for housing type, heating, household characteristics and selection into the plan. Their 
estimated own-price and income elasticities are -0.72 and 0.04 respectively. Also in Ireland, Dulleck 
et al. (2004) use monthly time-series data of household electricity use over the period 1976 to 1993 
to examine the impact of demand management policies that provided information and offered 
minor incentives to customers (e.g., information leaflets with households’ electricity bills). They find 
that the introduction of information programs reduces long-term electricity usage by 7 per cent. 
 
In a statistical analysis of the Irish data to which we apply econometrics later in this paper, 
Commission for Energy Regulation (2011a) finds that application of TOU tariffs with a selection of 
informational stimuli reduce overall household electricity use by an average of 2.5 per cent and peak 
demand by 8.8 per cent. They also find that households with an IHD or with high pre-trial demand 
reduced demand more than others, but that increases in the ratio of peak to off-peak prices beyond 
the initial step tested do not lead to further statistically significant reductions in demand. They 
conclude that demand is highly price inelastic. 
3 Data  
The residential component of the trial involved over 5,000 households (customers of Electric 
Ireland8) who were asked to participate in the trial.9 In order to assess whether TOU pricing and 
information stimuli led to a change in household electricity consumption, half-hourly data were 
collected for each household over the period 14 July 2009 to 31 December 2010.10 Households were 
randomly assigned to either the control or treatment groups for the commencement of the 
experiment on 1 January 2010. The control group was billed on their normal tariff and saw no 
changes to their bill. They received none of the information stimuli and were requested to continue 
using their electricity as normal (Commission for Energy Regulation, 2011a). Benchmark pre-trial 
data is available for all households (both control and treatment) for the period 14 July 2009-31 
December 2009. 
                                                             
7 The keypad meters combine a rechargeable card control with an interactive display that allows consumers to 
easily monitor their electric usage and cost. In November 2010, they accounted for just over one-third of 
residential electricity customers. 
8 At the time of recruitment (mid-2008), Electric Ireland customers represented 100 per cent of residential 
electricity customers in Ireland (Commission for Energy Regulation, 2011a). 
9 We focus on residential electricity participants in this paper, as the publicly-released micro-data relate only to 
residential participants in the trial. 
10 Data collection started earlier in 2009, but the anonymised dataset provided to researchers omitted data 
collected up to 14 July due to incompleteness of the sample. 
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Treatment households were randomly assigned to different TOU tariff groups and to different 
information stimuli groups. The allocation of treatment households between tariffs and information 
stimulus groups was decided by the regulator at the end of 2009. In order to allocate the treated 
groups between different tariffs and information stimuli a principal component analysis was applied 
to identify the main household characteristics and to optimally combine interest in energy reduction 
and usage profile. Given these combinations, the participants were randomly allocated to different 
treatment groups.11 
Four TOU tariffs were tested. TOU prices referred to peak (17:00-18:59 Monday-Friday, excluding 
public holidays), day (08:00-16:59; 19:00-22:59 Monday-Friday, plus 17:00-18:59 public holidays, 
Saturday and Sunday) and night (23:00-07:59) periods (based on system demand peaks). A weekend 
tariff was also tested (whereby the night rate applied all day Saturday and Sunday, with separate 
peak, day and night tariffs for weekdays). In comparison with the initial flat-rate tariff, the electricity 
price associated with peak hour consumption rose up to a maximum of 166 per cent of its initial 
value, while the price of electricity during the day and night was decreased by a maximum of 13 per 
cent and 37 per cent respectively. The TOU tariffs were designed to be neutral in comparison with 
the standard flat-rate tariff to ensure that the average participant who did not change their 
electricity consumption would not be financially penalised.   
The regulation authority states that “ Throughout the Trial all participants testing time-of-use tariffs 
were guaranteed that they would not pay more for their electricity than if they had been on the 
normal Electric Ireland tariff (14.1c per unit ex VAT). Accordingly, all participants received a 
balancing credit at the end of the benchmark period and in January 2011. The small number of 
individuals who incurred costs above this average were recompensed on a case by case basis”.12 
The base TOU tariff (Tariff A) reflects the underlying cost of energy transmission, distribution, 
generation and supply (Commission for Energy Regulation, 2011a). Table 1 sets out the various price 
levels applying in the control and treatment periods.13 
 
[insert Table 1 here] 
 
In addition, treatment groups were also subjected to one of four information stimuli.14 In Ireland, 
electricity customers typically receive bi-monthly paper bills. Households in the treatment group 
were randomly assigned to one of four groups; bi-monthly billing, monthly billing, bi-monthly billing 
plus IHD stimulus, bi-monthly billing plus overall load reduction (OLR) stimulus. OLR refers to 
households who received €20 (plus their energy savings) if they reached a monthly target (based on 
                                                             
11 For a complete description of the allocation between stimulus and tariff groups see Commission for Energy 
Regulation (2011a). 
12 These payments ranged from €30 under Tariff A to €90 under tariff D (Commission for Energy Regulation, 
2011 a pp.8). 
13 There is some debate in the literature over whether households respond to average or marginal prices. It 
has been argued that households respond to average price, which is easily calculated and observable (see 
Alberini et al., 2011 for example). 
14 Treatment households were also supplied with a fridge magnet (detailing the time bands and associated 
costs) and a sticker (detailing the time bands) (Commission for Energy Regulation, 2011a). 
8 
 
historic trend minus 10 per cent). As the precise prices faced by households in the OLR group could 
not be determined, we excluded these households (n=940) from our analysis.15 Among the 
treatment group therefore, 13 distinct groups defined by combinations of the various TOU tariffs 
and information stimuli are identified. Table 2 outlines the numbers of control and treatment 
observations available for analysis.16 
 
[insert Table 2 here] 
 
The quality of the data on electricity consumption is very high. Only a small percentage of 
households were excluded due to incomplete records (i.e., due to signal problems impacting on the 
return of half-hourly smart meter readings). Detailed information on each of the participating 
households was also collected, both before and after the trial period. Information on household 
composition, appliance ownership and use, as well as attitudes towards energy conservation and the 
environment was collected. As detailed below, we also examine the response of different household 
types to the various TOU tariffs and information stimuli. This requires detailed information on 
household composition and socio-economic status.  We use an indicator of the highest level of 
education completed by the chief income earner of the household in order to identify different 
household types as there are some problems with other potential indicators.17  
 
As the control period started on the 14th of July 2009, we also exclude the first seven months of the 
treatment period to correctly estimate household responses to the introduction of tariffs and 
information stimuli. The final sample size is 967,756 observations, across 2,831 households (768 in 
the control group, and 2,063 in the treatment group). 
 
The main focus of this paper is the estimation of the reaction of households to different TOU tariffs 
and different information stimuli. However, electricity demand is also affected by other factors. As 
discussed in Section 2, previous research has highlighted the importance of the weather and the 
number of appliances in each household in determining electricity consumption. In addition to price 
and information stimuli, we therefore include in our analysis the number of electric appliances 
owned by the household18, and proxies for the temperature and climate variables in the form of 
heating degree days (HDD) and sunshine hours for each individual day over the period 14 July 2009 – 
                                                             
15 A sample of the information provided with the bills can be found on pp.85 of Commission for Energy 
Regulation (2011a). 
16 Half-hourly data were aggregated to daily totals. 
17 For example, the indicator of household income is poorly recorded (many missing observations, and an 
analysis of the summary statistics indicates that the wording of the question caused confusion among 
households in relation to whether responses should be annual, monthly or weekly income, or pre- or post-tax. 
In addition, information on the number and ages of individuals in the household did not allow us to distinguish 
among households with children of different ages. 
18 For the appliances we consider the numbers of washing machines, dishwashers, tumble dryers, laptops and 
PCs, TVs, electric cookers, electric showers and standalone freezers owned by each household. In the heating 
dummy variable we consider whether the household has electric heating or an electric water heating/pumping 
system in the house. The number of appliances is strongly significant in all our estimations. 
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31 December 2010.19 We also include a categorical variable that indicate the day of the week, and a 
binary variable that indicates public holidays. 
 
Moreover, we create a dummy variable which is equal to 1 for households that have electric heating, 
and we interact this variable with the HDD indicator, to control for heterogeneity in the response to 
temperature among households that have different heating methods. In this way, we also control for 
potential effects on electricity consumption during the months of November and December 2010, 
when it was unusually cold in Ireland (see Figure 1).  
4 Methodology 
The main advantage of the experiment conducted on smart metering and TOU pricing in Ireland is 
that our data are unaffected by the selection bias that usually characterises this type of analysis.20 
While initial participation in the experiment was not random, households were subsequently 
randomly assigned to either the control or treatment groups. This means the sample was collected 
with the objective that the treatment and the control groups should not have any significant 
differences apart from the treatment. In order to test the effectiveness of this approach, we 
estimated a probit model in which the dependent variable was the probability of being part of the 
treated group and the independent variables were household characteristics (age of the individual 
who responded to the household questionnaire, appliances used by the household, level of 
education of the chief income earner of the household). None of these variables proved to be 
significant at the standard significance levels, as highlighted in Table 3. Moreover, a comparison of 
the means of different variables that summarise the household characteristics did not show any 
significant difference. 21 
 
[insert Table 3 here] 
 
As we also have information from the benchmark period for control and treatment groups, the 
natural choice of estimator for the reaction to different tariffs and stimuli is the difference-in-
difference estimator. This technique allows us to correctly estimate the difference in the means 
between the control and the treatment groups in the treatment period, controlling for common 
trends across the two groups during the control period.  
Let us denote it as the mean of the outcome of the group i at time t, in which i is equal to 0 (control 
group) or 1 (treatment group) and t is equal to 0 (control period) or to 1 (treatment period). As the 
only difference between the households who populate our sample is the treatment, we estimate the 
difference-in-differences (ߤଵଵ − ߤ଴ଵ) , using the random effects estimator for panel data. 
 
                                                             
19 Information on HDD and sunshine hours is available for Dublin Airport only. In any case, more detailed 
information on the regional location of households is not available. 
20 See Card and Kruger , 1984), among others. 
21 Details on request from the authors. 
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We estimate three different versions of our model: a benchmark case; a model in which the sample 
is divided by the highest education level of the chief income earner of the household; and models in 
which we distinguish between additional household types (based on the age of the survey 
respondent, and the occupancy status of the household  (rent, owned outright and owned with 
mortgage)). 
 
Impact of different TOU tariffs on electricity demand 
In order to test the impact of a change in the tariff structure, given the different information stimuli, 
we estimate the following equation: 
 
 ݍ௜,௧ = ߙ଴ + ߙଵܶܽݎ݂݂݅ܣଵଵ + ߙଶܶܽݎ݂݂݅ܤଵଵ + ߙଷܶܽݎ݂݂݅ܥଵଵ + ߙସܶܽݎ݂݂݅ܦଵଵ+ ߙହܶܽݎ݂݂݅ ଵܹଵ + ߙ଺ܦ௣௛௢௟ + ෍ߙ଻଺
௜ୀଵ
ܹ݇݀ܽݕݏ + ߙ଼ݏݑ݊ݏℎ݅݊݁௧ + ߙଽܪܦܦ௧+ αଵ଴ ௧ܶ + ߙଵଵ ௚ܶ + ߙଵଶܣ݌݌݈݅ܽ݊ܿ݁ݏ + ߙଵଷܧ݈݁ܿݐܪ݁ܽݐ	+ 	ߙଵସܪܦܦܧ݈݁ܿܪ݁ܽݐ 
 
(1) 
 
in which ݍ௜,௧  is the daily consumption of electricity in the three different time of the day (peak, day, 
night), ܶܽݎ݂݂݅ܣଵଵ is the dummy variable indicating that the household was exposed to tariff A 
during the treatment period,  ܶܽݎ݂݂݅ܤଵଵ is the dummy variable indicating that the household was 
exposed to tariff B during the treatment period,  etc. 	ܶܽݎ݂݂݅ ଵܹଵ  is the dummy variable indicating 
that the household was exposed to the weekend tariff during the treatment period (this tariff was 
applied only to consumers facing the bi-monthly billing information stimulus). ௧ܶ   is the dummy 
variable for the treatment period, ௚ܶ  is the dummy variable for the treated group, ܦ௣௛௢௟ 	 is the 
dummy variable for public holidays, Wkdays are dummies which are equal to 1 on the various days 
of the week,  HDD is a variable that reflects the heating degree days, sunshine is a variable that 
reflects sunshine hours (not included in the night specification), Appliances is a count variable of the 
number of appliances owned by the household and ElecHeat is a dummy variable indicating that the 
household has an electric heating system. The variable HDDElecHeat is a variable that interacts the 
HDD with the ElecHeat dummy; this variable should control for high electricity consumption during 
the winter of 2010, in which the temperatures in Ireland were exceptionally low, as well as the 
differential response to TOU tariffs among households with different heating types. The coefficients 
ߙଵ −	ߙସ	 represent our difference-in-difference estimates (i.e., the effect of the four TOU tariffs on 
household electricity consumption). We estimate nine different specifications of the model, which 
represent different combinations of time of day (peak, day, night) and information stimulus 
(bimonthly billing, monthly billing, IHD).   
 
The treatment period dummy ௧ܶ 	that we include in our analysis simply indicates the differences in 
the dependent variable between the control and the treatment period, that is: 
	 ௧ܶ = ܧ(ݕ௜|ܿ݋݊ݐݎ݌) − ܧ(ݕ௜|ݐݎ݁ܽݐ݉݁݊ݐ݌). We expect that this variable will be negative and 
significant in all models, as the change in tariffs and information stimuli should lead treated 
households to be more aware of their electricity consumption and to take steps to reduce their 
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consumption. On the contrary, we expect that the treatment group dummy  ௚ܶ  will be always 
insignificant as the treatment and the control groups are not statistically different to each other (as 
demonstrated above). 
 
Differential response to TOU pricing and information stimuli by household education level 
To correctly disentangle the differences in electricity consumption between households with 
different socio-economic characteristics we re-estimate model (1) for different subsamples of the 
initial sample. The response rate to the income question in the pre-trial survey was poor, and the 
information on household composition (e.g., number and ages of children) is not detailed enough to 
construct a household composition variable. Instead, we use information on the highest education 
level of the chief income earner of the household. We disaggregate households on the basis of 
whether the chief income earner had a third level qualification or not (38.3 per cent of households 
are thus classified as ‘high education households’, while 61.7 percent are classified as ‘low education 
households’).  
 
The education level of the household (proxied by that of the chief income earner) may have non-
trivial effects on electricity consumption during different times of the day: on one hand, high 
education households may be more concerned about the efficient use of their appliances, and we 
therefore might observe a higher contraction in consumption during the peak hours among these 
households than among low education households. On the other hand, education can (at least 
partially) pick up some of the income effects, and so we might expect that low education households 
might be more concerned about price than the high education households.  
 
Differential response to TOU pricing and information stimuli by alternative household 
characteristics 
While the education level of the chief income earner is our main indicator of household socio-
economic status, we also ran the models using alternative household sub-samples. First, we 
distinguish between households of different ages, as proxied by the age of the survey respondent. 
We consider 4 different age groups: young people, aged 18-34; adults aged 35-54; adults in the last 
stage of their career (55-64) and retired people (i.e., those aged 65+). Second, we also consider 
household occupancy status. While acting as a proxy for household resources, this potentially also 
affects the household reaction to different prices as the inclusion of utility payments in rent may 
reduce the effectiveness of increasing electricity prices.  
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5 Empirical Results22 
 
Impact of different TOU tariffs on electricity demand 
Tables 4-6 present the results of the difference-in-difference analysis of the introduction of TOU 
tariffs for the peak, day and night periods respectively (with the samples further disaggregated by 
information stimuli). The treatment period dummy is strongly negative and significant in both the 
peak and day specifications. The same result emerges from the analysis performed by Faruqui and 
Sergici (2009); however, our results are not directly comparable as their study accounts only for 
differences in the pricing structures before and after the treatment period, whereas our analysis also 
assesses the impact of differences in information stimuli. As expected, the consumption of electricity 
decreases more during peak than day hours. Moreover, in our analysis electricity consumption 
decreases even during the night hours, but this decline is not statistically significant. As expected, 
the treatment group dummy is always insignificant, with the exception of the night specification 
where it is sometimes weakly significant. 23 
 
Variables relating to the day of the week are largely significant, and have signs that are consistent 
with expectations (i.e., relative to Wednesdays, peak consumption is lower, and day consumption is 
higher on weekends). Peak period electricity consumption is also significantly lower on public 
holidays (and day consumption correspondingly higher). 
 
The influence of the weather is highly significant. The effects of HDD and sunshine hours are positive 
and negative respectively.24 When HDD is interacted with the indicator for electric heating, the 
effect of HDD is more strongly positive, indicating the particular burden that low temperatures place 
on those that rely on electric heating. Finally, the number of appliances installed in each house is 
positive and significant in all the different specifications of the model. 
 
From Table 4 it is clear that consumption during the peak hours is negatively affected by the initial 
introduction of TOU tariffs. However, across the different information stimuli, there are differences 
in both the magnitude of the effects, and how consumption responds to increasing tariffs. For 
example, in the peak period model, electricity consumption is always lower under tariff D (with the 
                                                             
22 For the smart metering experiment analysed in this paper, a statistical analysis of the impact of the TOU 
tariffs and information stimuli on total and peak demand was also carried out on behalf of the Commission for 
Energy Regulation by The Research Perspective and Insight Statistical Consulting (Commission for Energy 
Regulation, 2011a). They found that overall, the introduction of the TOU tariffs and the information stimuli 
resulted in statistically significant reductions in total electricity consumption of 2.5 per cent and peak 
electricity consumption of 8.8 per cent. These results were used subsequently in the cost-benefit analysis of 
the smart metering trial. They also found that the stimulus combining bi-monthly bill, energy usage statement 
and electricity monitor was more effective than other information stimuli in reducing peak usage with a peak 
shift of 11.3 per cent, and that households with higher electricity consumption were more responsive to TOU 
pricing and the information stimuli.  
23 For the night specification this dummy might include a compositional difference between the treatment and 
control groups that exists in the night time (and which was not apparent in the overall results presented in 
Table 3). 
24 We exclude the number of sunshine hours from the night demand analysis. 
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highest ratio of peak to night prices) than under tariff A (with the lowest). In the households where 
IHDs are installed, there is a linear relationship between the size of the tariff applied and the 
contraction in electricity consumption. However, when the stimulus is characterised by the provision 
of less frequent information (bi-monthly or monthly paper billing), the magnitude of the reduction is 
different across the different tariffs. For instance, when the households receive a bi-monthly bill, the 
contraction in electricity consumption during the peak is higher under tariff B than tariff A, which is 
plausible. However, households that face tariff C do not respond to the increase in the peak period 
electricity tariff, although those on tariff D do respond significantly. A similar nonlinearity in the 
consumption contraction in the peak period under the four different tariffs is associated with the 
monthly billing stimulus, although the pattern is closer to that observed for the IHD stimulus.  
 
Although the IHD stimulus is associated with the most consistent-looking price response, it is still 
weak in absolute terms.  The ratio of peak to night prices rises from about 1.7 in Tariff A to 4.2 in 
Tariff D as per Table 1.  This is a substantial relative price change.  Nevertheless, the associated 
reduction in peak usage is only 1 per cent for each step change in tariff and a total of 4.5 per cent 
from Tariff A to D.  More than a doubling of the peak/night ratio leads to a reduction of less than 5 
per cent in peak demand. These results show some consistency with previous research. Reiss and 
White (2005) found a non-linear reaction between the changes in electricity demand and the applied 
electricity prices in California. Pollitt and Shaorshadze (2011) and Ito (2010) discuss the possibility 
that the lack of continuous information might affect consumer reactions. Allcott and Mullainathan 
(2010) and Allcott (2011) highlight how consumers believes can be systematically biased when they 
are evaluating energy costs.  
 
In the Irish experiment, monthly and bi-monthly billing might not provide sufficient information to 
households, who then cannot regulate their behaviour consistently with the tariff applied. In 
contrast, the provision of real-time information on both the quantity and cost of electricity 
consumed via the IHD seems to result in more consistent behaviour among the treatment group 
households (at least in the peak period). Overall, household responses may be dominated by 
application of some simple heuristic: they know peak prices are now higher than other times of day 
and they change behaviour to reflect this, but further increases in the differential are either not fully 
perceived or evoke only a weak response for some other reason. 
 
Electricity consumption during the day and night is less responsive to TOU tariffs.  As Table 1 
highlights, the changes from the control period for the day tariff were quite low (ranging from -2.2 
per cent under tariff A to -12.6 per cent under tariff D), so it is perhaps understandable that 
households did not change their consumption significantly.  
 
In contrast, night tariffs varied from -16.1 per cent to -37.1 per cent than those applying in the 
control period. However, the lack of reaction of the households to TOU pricing in the night period 
under all the various stimuli may be explained by considering that consumers tend to react more to 
a price increase than to a price decrease (see Dawes, 2004). In addition, the night tariff began at 11 
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p.m, making it difficult to shift the usage of many appliances (cooker, shower and washing machine) 
to these hours.  
 
Differential response to TOU pricing and information stimuli by household education level 
To ascertain whether the response to TOU pricing is different across households with different 
education levels, we run the models on the subsamples of low education and high education 
households. Tables 7 and 8 present the results of the difference-in-difference analysis for the low- 
and high education households with IHDs respectively.25  
 
[insert Tables 7 and 8 here] 
 
Focussing on the peak period first, the results indicate that low education households respond only 
to higher peak prices when receiving a monthly bill, or in possession of an IHD. The reaction of high 
education households to the peak pricing structure is similar, although the effects are slightly smaller 
in magnitude, and there is some response to higher peak prices among high education households 
who receive a bi-monthly bill. This suggests once again that regular feedback in the form of an IHD is 
more effective in reducing peak-period electricity consumption than other stimuli, and the results 
also provide some evidence to suggest that this effect is stronger for low education households. As 
with the baseline results, day consumption is largely unaffected by TOU pricing. High education 
households are similarly unaffected by TOU pricing for night consumption, while TOU pricing has a 
significant effect on night consumption for low education households who have an IHD. The effects 
show that decreasing night prices are associated with increasing consumption, which suggest that 
low education households with an IHD are responding to TOU tariffs by shifting consumption to the 
night hours. There is no such effect for low education households with the bi-monthly or monthly 
billing options however. 
 
Differential response to TOU pricing and information stimuli by alternative household 
characteristics 
Splitting the sample using alternative indicators of household socio-economic status confirms the 
general results. However, some interesting conclusions might be drawn for the age groups and the 
house occupancy type. First, adults (aged 35-54) are the most responsive to changes in the peak 
prices, when IHD is installed. Second, households who are renting their apartment seem to be less 
responsive to change in peak pricing than households who live in their own houses. The last result 
can be understood by considering that sometime the rent is inclusive of the utility bills; this affects 
the incentives in changing the electricity consumption in presence of different tariffs and stimuli.26 
                                                             
25 Results for households on the bi-monthly and monthly billing options are available on request from the 
authors. 
26 Results for this section are available from the authors on request. 
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7 Discussion, Summary and Conclusions 
 
The analysis in this paper presents estimates of the response of a sample of Irish households to TOU 
tariffs and information stimuli in the residential electricity market. The quality of the data, along 
with the careful  experimental design, allows us to examine these issues for the first time in Ireland. 
While the impact of TOU tariffs and information stimuli has been examined in other countries, the 
application to Ireland presents evidence for a country with a very different climate to that analysed 
in most recent analyses (i.e., a temperate climate with no household air conditioning).  
 
Our results show that TOU tariffs and information stimuli are effective in influencing electricity 
consumption. In terms of information stimuli, the provision of an IHD is particularly significant. It 
must be noted that our results are not directly comparable with those of the statistical analysis of 
the data (Commission for Energy Regulation, 2011a). The statistical analysis involved a before-after 
analysis of electricity consumption under the different TOU tariffs and information stimuli. In 
addition, the researchers did not impose any parametric assumptions on the relationship between 
electricity consumption and prices/information stimuli and they imputed missing values for the 
cases in which electricity consumption readings were missing. Our analysis further controls for 
possible sources of heterogeneity across households (e.g., appliance ownership), and this allows us 
to separate out the pure effect of the variation in the tariffs and the presence of the stimuli from the 
environmental and household specific characteristics.  
 
Our results are particularly interesting as they highlight how the presence of different TOU tariffs, in 
combination with different information stimuli, affects household electricity consumption during 
different times of the day. The results of different TOU tariffs indicate that TOU pricing is only 
statistically significant in influencing household electricity consumption during the peak period. This 
is not surprising given the sharp increases in peak period prices that were observed between the 
control and treatment periods, while the changes for the day and night periods were much smaller 
(see Table 1). However, we do observe a non-linear response to TOU tariffs for the peak period for 
households that received a bimonthly or monthly paper bill, in contrast to the results for households 
with an IHD where the response is linear. The magnitude of the results for monthly paper billing are 
closer to the results for the IHD stimulus, while the results for the bimonthly paper billing option are 
smaller in magnitude. This is consistent with the research noted above that stresses the importance 
of regular and easily understood feedback in influencing consumer energy use. 
 
While there is a general tendency for peak usage to fall when TOU tariffs are in place regardless of 
information treatment, additional increases in the ratio of peak to night prices only results in limited 
further absolute decreases in usage. This could imply that while households understand that peak 
prices are higher under the new tariffs, but they do not fully understand how much higher they are 
under specific plans or that they have little scope to respond to higher prices beyond their initial 
reaction. 
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In order to understand how different groups react to the same changes in the TOU tariffs we split 
our sample in two, considering low and high education households separately. Our results show 
that, for the peak period, regular feedback in the form of an IHD is particularly effective in reducing 
peak-period electricity consumption, and the results also provide some evidence to suggest that this 
effect is stronger for low education households. The fact that high education households respond in 
a linear way to increasing peak prices is consistent with the research of Ito (2010) who suggests that 
individuals with higher education levels are better able to understand prices and information stimuli. 
However, the larger magnitude of the effects for low education households and the finding that 
these households shift electricity consumption towards the night period is suggestive of greater 
price sensitivity on the part of low education households, perhaps due to the correlation between 
education level and income. The fact that the latter effect is significant only for households with 
IHDs reinforces the importance of easily-understood, instantaneous feedback in influencing 
electricity consumption. 
 
In the context of European climate policy targets and the importance of matching electricity supply 
and demand, these results have important policy implications. They indicate that TOU pricing can be 
effective in influencing peak period household electricity consumption, and suggest than the price 
response is more consistent when accompanied by real-time feedback in the form of an IHD. 
However, the weakness of responses to further relative price increases may suggest that the scope 
for demand response is quickly exhausted or that consumers use simple heuristics when considering 
how to respond. Further research will be needed to determine which of these mechanisms is most 
significant. The importance of appropriate information is again highlighted by the different results 
for households with low and high education levels. 
 
  
17 
 
References 
 
Alberini, A., Gans, W. & Velez-Lopez, D. (2011) Residential consumption of gas and electricity in the 
US: the role of prices and income. Energy Economics, 33(5), 870-881. 
Allcott, H., Sendhil,M. (2010) Behavior and Energy Policy. Science, 327(5), 1204-1205 
Allcott, H. (2011) Consumers’ Perceptions and Misperceptions of Energy Costs, American Economic 
Review, Papers and Proceedings, 101(3),  98-104. 
Aubin, C., Fougere, D., Husson, E. & Ivaldi, M. (1995) Real-Time Pricing of Electricity for Residential 
Customers: Econometric Analysis of an Experiment. Journal of Applied Econometrics, 
10S171-S191. 
Baker, P., Blundell, R. & Micklewright, J. (1989) Modelling Household Energy Expenditures using 
Micro-Data. The Economic Journal, 99(September), 720-738. 
Bartusch, C., Wallin, F., Odlare, M., Vassileva, I. & Wester, L. (2011) Introducing a demand-based 
electricity distribution tariff in the residential sector: demand response and customer 
perception. Energy Economics, 39(-), 5008-5025. 
Card, D. & Krueger, A. (1984) Minimum Wages and Employment: A Case Study of the Fast-Food 
Industry in New Jersey and Pennsylvania. American Economic Review, 84(4), 72-93. 
Charles River Associates (2005) Impact Evaluation of the California Statewide Pricing Pilot. Oakland, 
California: Charles River Associates.  
Commission for Energy Regulation (2011a) Electricity Smart Metering Customer Behaviour Trials 
(CBT) Findings Report. Dublin: Commission for Energy Regulation.  
Commission for Energy Regulation (2011b) Results of Electricity Cost-Benefit Analysis, Customer 
Behaviour Trials and Technology Trials. Smart Metering Information Paper 4. Dublin: 
Commission for Energy Regulation.  
Darby, S. (2006) The Effectiveness of Feedback on Energy Consumption. Oxford: Environmental 
Change Institute, University of Oxford.  
Dawes, J. (2004) Price Changes and Defection Levels in a Subscription-type Market. Journal of 
Services Marketing, 18(1). 
Dulleck, U. & Kaufmann, S. (2004) Do customer information programs reduce household electricity 
demand? The Irish program. Energy Policy, 32(8), 1025-1032. 
Faruqui, A. & Sergici, S. (2009) Household Response to Dynamic Pricing of Electricity - A Survey of 
Experimental Evidence. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Brattle Group. Available at: 
http://www.hks.harvard.edu/hepg/Papers/2009/The%20Power%20of%20Experimentation%
20_01-11-09_.pdf [last accessed 19 September 2011]. 
Filippini, M. (1995) Swiss residential demand for electricity by time-of-use. Resource and Energy 
Economics, 17(3), 281-290. 
Filippini, M. (2011) Short and long-run time-of-use price elasticities in Swiss residential electricity 
demand. Energy Policy, 39(10), 5811-5817. 
Gans, W., Alberini, A. & Longo, A. (2011) Smart Meter Devices and the Effect of Feedback on 
Residential Electricity Consumption: Evidence from a Natural Experiment in Northern 
Ireland. Zurich: Centre for Energy Policy and Economics, Swiss Federal Institutes of 
Technology. Available at: 
http://www.cepe.ethz.ch/publications/workingPapers/CEPE_WP78.pdf [last accessed 01 
September 2011]. 
Gleerup, M., Larsen, A., Leth-Petersen, S. & Togeby, M. (2010) The Effect of Feedback by Text 
Message (SMS) and Email on Household Electricity Consumption: Experimental Evidence. 
Energy Journal, 31(3), 113-132. 
Ham, J., Mountain, D. & Chan, M. (1997) Time-of-use prices and electricity demnad: allowing for 
selection bias in experimental data. RAND Journal of Economics, 28(0), S113-S141. 
18 
 
Ito, K. (2010) Do Consumers Repsond to Average or Marginal Prices? Evidence from Nonlinear 
Electricity Pricing. Available at: http://ei.haas.berkeley.edu/pdf/working_papers/WP210.pdf 
[last accessed 29 May 2012]. 
Matsukawa, I. (2001) Household Response to Optional Peak-Load Pricing of Electricity. Journal of 
Regulatory Economics, 20(3), 249-267. 
Pollitt, M. & Shaorshadze, I. (2011) The Role of Behavioural Economics in Energy and Climate Policy. 
Available at: http://www.eprg.group.cam.ac.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2011/12/EPRG1130_Main.pdf [last accessed 29 May 2012]. 
Reiss, P. & White, M. (2005) Household Electricity Demand Revisited. Review of Economic Studies, 
72(3), 853-883. 
Wolak, F. (2011) Do Residential Customers Respond to Hourly Prices? Evidence from a Dynamic 
Pricing Experiment. American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings, 101(3), 83-87. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
19 
 
Appendix 
Table 1: Control and Treatment Period Tariffs (€ cents per kWh, including VAT) 
Tariff Control 
Period 
Treatment Period % change  
 Peak, Day 
and Night 
Peak Day Night Peak Day  Night 
Control 16.24 16.00 16.00 16.00 -1.5 -1.5 -1.5 
Tariff A 16.24 22.70 15.89 13.62 39.8 -2.2 -16.1 
Tariff B 16.24 29.51 15.32 12.46 81.7 -5.6 -23.1 
Tariff C 16.24 36.32 14.76 11.35 123.7 -9.1 -30.1 
Tariff D 16.24 43.13 14.19 10.22 165.6 -12.6 -37.1 
Tariff W/E 16.24 33.03 14.45 11.35 103.4 -11.0 -30.1 
Note: The control and treatment period prices for the control group are slightly different as the control period 
electricity tariff was reduced (for all customers of Electric Ireland) in October 2009. The treatment period price 
for the control group therefore reflects the new lower tariff that was charged for all participants from October 
2009 – December 2009, and for control group participants from January 2010. 
 
Table 2: Number of Households involved in the Trial  
Tariff Detail Bimonthly Monthly IHD Tot 
Control Group 768 n/a n/a 768 
A 226 241 232 699 
B 90 98 93 281 
C 250 245 233 728 
D 93 96 90 279 
W/E 76 n/a n/a 76 
Tot 1,503 680 648 2,831 
Source: Commission for Energy Regulation, 2011a. 
Note: the weekend tariff was only combined with the bi-monthly billing information stimulus. 
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Table 3 Probit results   
    
treatg Coef. Std. Err. 
   age group1 0.609 0.630 
age group2 0.644 0.626 
age group3 0.576 0.624 
age group4 0.719 0.625 
age group5 0.528 0.625 
appliances -0.082 0.059 
high education 0.012 0.086 
occupancy 0.055 0.072 
income group 0.025 0.029 
electric heating 0.021 0.150 
_cons 0.036 0.651 
 
***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1 
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Table 4: Estimation Results – Peak  
        
 
Bimonthly Monthly IHD 
Tariff A -0.0484** -0.0509** -0.0571*** 
  (0.0195) (0.0209) (0.0205) 
Tariff B -0.102** -0.0848*** -0.0673** 
  (0.0408) (0.0244) (0.0294) 
Tariff C -0.00777 -0.0818*** -0.0846*** 
  (0.0204) (0.0239) (0.0201) 
Tariff D -0.0625** -0.160*** -0.102*** 
  (0.028) (0.0325) (0.0377) 
Tariff W -0.176*** - - 
  (0.0474)  -  - 
Tp -0.0435*** -0.0426*** -0.0430*** 
  (0.0098) (0.0098) (0.0098) 
Tg 0.0421 0.0543 0.0552 
  (0.0369) (0.0369) (0.0381) 
DBankHoliday -0.0276** -0.0320*** -0.0189* 
  (0.0115) (0.0112) (0.0112) 
Sunday -0.138*** -0.134*** -0.132*** 
  (0.0092) (0.0092) (0.0094) 
Monday 0.00526 0.00735 0.00436 
  (0.0054) (0.0054) (0.0052) 
Tuesday 0.00988** 0.00750 0.00886* 
  (0.0047) (0.0049) (0.0046) 
Thursday -0.0319*** -0.0402*** -0.0322*** 
  (0.0052) (0.0056) (0.0052) 
Friday -0.0760*** -0.0832*** -0.0769*** 
  (0.0063) (0.0062) (0.0065) 
Saturday -0.0821*** -0.0876*** -0.0806*** 
  (0.0088) (0.0086) (0.0091) 
Sunshine -0.0219*** -0.0217*** -0.0214*** 
  (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) 
HDD 0.0392*** 0.0385*** 0.0383*** 
  (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0007) 
ElectricHeating -0.236*** -0.170** -0.214*** 
  (0.0772) (0.07) (0.075) 
HDDElecHeat 0.0121*** 0.0118*** 0.0151*** 
  (0.0039) (0.0037) (0.0037) 
Appliances 0.208*** 0.204*** 0.191*** 
  (0.0282) (0.0297) (0.028) 
Constant -0.563*** -0.554*** -0.522*** 
  (0.0758) (0.0798) (0.075) 
        
Observations 512,772 494,036 483,338 
Standard errors in parenthesis, ***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1 
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Table 5:  Estimation Results – Day 
 
Bimonthly Monthly IHD 
Tariff A -0.0130 -0.0260 0.00542 
  (0.0165) (0.0173) (0.0186) 
Tariff B -0.0411 -0.0188 -0.00117 
  (0.0358) (0.023) (0.024) 
Tariff C 0.0300* -0.0155 -0.00723 
  (0.0156) (0.0207) (0.0163) 
Tariff D -0.00821 -0.0470* -0.00705 
  (0.0226) (0.0255) (0.0253) 
Tariff W -0.0765* - - 
  (0.0418)  -  - 
Tp -0.0335*** -0.0325*** -0.0330*** 
  (0.0088) (0.0088) (0.0088) 
Tg 0.0238 0.0361 0.0438 
  (0.0319) (0.0324) (0.0326) 
DBankHoliday 0.0888*** 0.0769*** 0.0814*** 
  (0.0082) (0.0083) (0.0084) 
Sunday 0.0773*** 0.0799*** 0.0739*** 
  (0.0061) (0.006) (0.0065) 
Monday -0.00883*** -0.00386 -0.00741** 
  (0.0033) (0.0032) (0.0031) 
Tuesday -0.000581 0.000725 0.00192 
  (0.0027) (0.0028) (0.0027) 
Thursday -0.0187*** -0.0208*** -0.0172*** 
  (0.0028) (0.0031) (0.0029) 
Friday -0.0226*** -0.0272*** -0.0227*** 
  (0.0035) (0.0036) (0.0039) 
Saturday 0.0540*** 0.0522*** 0.0479*** 
  (0.0056) (0.0053) (0.006) 
Sunshine -0.00986*** -0.00968*** -0.00960*** 
  (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
HDD 0.0224*** 0.0215*** 0.0218*** 
  (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) 
ElectricHeating -0.190*** -0.114* -0.127* 
  (0.0718) (0.0651) (0.0649) 
HDDElecHeat 0.0118*** 0.0135*** 0.0128*** 
  (0.0039) (0.0034) (0.0035) 
Appliances 0.186*** 0.174*** 0.154*** 
  (0.0256) (0.0267) (0.0251) 
Constant -0.635*** -0.606*** -0.556*** 
  (0.0688) (0.0717) (0.0675) 
        
Observations 513,165 494,377 483,578 
Standard errors in parenthesis 
***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1 
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Table 6: Estimation Results - Night 
 
Bimonthly Monthly IHD 
Tariff A 0.0186 -0.00189 0.0316* 
  (0.0163) (0.0175) (0.0177) 
Tariff B 0.0102 0.0361 0.0303 
  (0.0316) (0.0266) (0.0295) 
Tariff C 0.0660*** 0.0211 0.0382** 
  (0.0175) (0.0208) (0.0182) 
Tariff D 0.0450 0.0112 0.0388 
  (0.0296) (0.0298) (0.0237) 
Tariff W -0.0419 - - 
  (0.0316)     
Tp -0.0106 -0.00866 -0.00975 
  (0.0089) (0.0089) (0.0089) 
Tg 0.0549* 0.0682** 0.0668** 
  (0.0318) (0.0334) (0.0337) 
DBankHoliday 0.00776 -0.00244 0.00619 
  (0.0066) (0.0064) (0.0066) 
Sunday -0.0418*** -0.0405*** -0.0407*** 
  (0.0048) (0.0045) (0.0047) 
Monday -0.0132*** -0.00983*** -0.00953*** 
  (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0025) 
Tuesday -0.00193 -0.00107 -0.00134 
  (0.0021) (0.0018) (0.0018) 
Thursday 0.00418** 0.00357* 0.00463** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.0019) 
Friday 0.0244*** 0.0190*** 0.0224*** 
  (0.0026) (0.0025) (0.0027) 
Saturday -0.0176*** -0.0170*** -0.0178*** 
  (0.0044) (0.0043) (0.0044) 
HDD 0.0110*** 0.00956*** 0.0103*** 
  (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) 
ElectricHeating -0.233*** -0.150** -0.194*** 
  (0.0692) (0.0652) (0.0651) 
HDDElecHeat 0.0132*** 0.0131*** 0.0137*** 
  (0.0039) (0.0035) (0.004) 
Appliances 0.0992*** 0.0915*** 0.0861*** 
  (0.0252) (0.0278) (0.0258) 
Constant -1.158*** -1.137*** -1.126*** 
  (0.0682) (0.0746) (0.0692) 
        
Observations 512,853 494,200 483,355 
 
Standard errors in parenthesis 
***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1 
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Table 7: Estimation result – Education (high), IHD 
   Peak Day Night 
Tariff A -0.0846*** -0.0172 0.00414 
  (0.0296) (0.0227) (0.026) 
Tariff B -0.114** -0.0492 -0.0159 
  (0.0561) (0.0496) (0.0583) 
Tariff C -0.106*** -0.0233 0.00241 
  (0.0292) (0.0246) (0.0274) 
Tariff D -0.0673 0.0192 0.0240 
  (0.0630) (0.0483) (0.0447) 
Tp -0.0238 -0.0164 -0.00329 
  (0.0178) (0.0153) (0.016) 
Tg 0.0719 0.0482 0.0138 
  (0.0659) (0.0557) (0.0568) 
DBankHoliday -0.0638*** 0.0573*** -0.0303** 
  (0.0213) (0.0159) (0.0121) 
Sunday -0.0814*** 0.0929*** -0.0646*** 
  (0.0165) (0.0117) (0.0081) 
Monday 0.0307*** -0.000661 -0.00923** 
  (0.00892) (0.00555) (0.0044) 
Tuesday 0.0188** -0.00120 0.000606 
  (0.00801) (0.005) (0.0031) 
Thursday -0.0321*** -0.0194*** 0.00162 
  (0.00870) (0.0054) (0.0035) 
Friday -0.0835*** -0.0282*** 0.0124*** 
  (0.0106) (0.0063) (0.0042) 
Saturday -0.0820*** 0.0457*** -0.0414*** 
  (0.0157) (0.0114) (0.0076) 
Sunshine -0.0230*** -0.0106*** - 
  (0.000817) (0.0006) - 
HDD 0.0394*** 0.0224*** 0.0122*** 
  (0.00118) (0.0009) (0.0011) 
HDDElecHeat 0.0135* 0.0104 0.0137 
  (0.00707) (0.0084) (0.0088) 
Appliances 0.218*** 0.177*** 0.0771* 
  (0.0507) (0.0447) (0.0439) 
Constant -0.611*** -0.596*** -0.988*** 
  (0.142) (0.126) (0.123) 
        
Observations 173,393 173,506 173,333 
 
 
Standard errors in parenthesis 
***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1 
Results for bi-monthly and monthly billing are available from the authors upon request. 
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 Table 8:  Estimation results – Education (low), IHD 
   Peak Day Night 
Tariff A -0.0410 0.0240 0.0527** 
  (0.0302) (0.0289) (0.0259) 
Tariff B -0.0498 0.0267 0.0561* 
  (0.0343) (0.0247) (0.0332) 
Tariff C -0.0828*** -0.00384 0.0596** 
  (0.0275) (0.0218) (0.0248) 
Tariff D -0.125** -0.0201 0.0559** 
  (0.0492) (0.0296) (0.0269) 
Tp -0.0542*** -0.0459*** -0.0152 
  (0.0123) (0.0116) (0.0115) 
Tg 0.0730 0.0601 0.0908** 
  (0.0486) (0.0418) (0.0435) 
DBankHoliday 0.00585 0.0977*** 0.0274*** 
  (0.0135) (0.0103) (0.0081) 
Sunday -0.160*** 0.0618*** -0.0251*** 
  (0.0119) (0.00834) (0.0059) 
Monday -0.00637 -0.0130*** -0.00858*** 
  (0.0066) (0.00382) (0.0031) 
Tuesday 0.00439 0.00216 -0.00222 
  (0.0059) (0.0033) (0.0023) 
Thursday -0.0319*** -0.0172*** 0.00703*** 
  (0.0068) (0.0036) (0.0024) 
Friday -0.0741*** -0.0208*** 0.0293*** 
  (0.0088) (0.0052) (0.0037) 
Saturday -0.0834*** 0.0483*** -0.00315 
  (0.0114) (0.0072) (0.0056) 
Sunshine -0.0204*** -0.00881*** - 
  (0.0007) (0.0004) - 
HDD 0.0376*** 0.0214*** 0.00921*** 
  (0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0009) 
HDDElecHeat 0.0158*** 0.0146*** 0.0144*** 
  (0.0043) (0.0037) (0.0044) 
Appliances 0.184*** 0.145*** 0.0799** 
  (0.0358) (0.0324) (0.034) 
Constant -0.529*** -0.567*** -1.200*** 
  (0.0933) (0.085) (0.0895) 
        
Observations 278,881 278,998 278,948 
 
Standard errors in parenthesis 
***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1 
Results for bi-monthly and monthly billing are available from the authors upon request. 
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Figure 1: Monthly temperatures, average (1990-2009) and 2010 
 
Data source: Met Eireann, various years 
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